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Introduction 
 
 
U.S.-led Bombardment Challenges 
Islamic State’s Hold on Eastern Syria 
But without Addressing the Roots of the Conflict, the Group Will Remain Hard to Beat 
Khaled Yacoub Oweis 
In July 2014, the so-called Islamic State solidified its hold on large parts of the Euphra-
tes river basin in eastern Syria, expelling its al-Qaeda rivals from the region, weeks after 
having captured the city of Mosul in neighboring Iraq and having declared a caliphate. 
The advance undermined the pro-Assad Shi’ite-dominated government in Baghdad and 
prompted Syrian regime forces to confront the group. In September 2014, a U.S.-led air 
campaign against the Islamic State in Iraq expanded into Syria. It was met by dismay on 
the part of Syria’s opposition about the lack of pressure on President Bashar al-Assad as 
jihadists feed on Sunni resentment against his minority Alawite rule. This has increased 
the urgency for forging an international solution to Syria’s civil war that not only ad-
dresses the jihadist dimension but also includes a strategy to reclaim the east – namely 
one that provides an alternative to Islamist militancy and the Assad family’s reign. 
 
Comprising the provinces of Raqqa and 
Deir al-Zor along the Euphrates river basin, 
eastern Syria has been among the most 
neglected parts of Syria for decades, despite 
accounting for one-third of national gas 
and oil production and contributing signi-
ficantly to its wheat and cotton output. 
Divide-and-rule tactics during the reign of 
President Hafez al-Assad (1970–2000), father 
of current President Bashar, altered the 
region’s tribal structure by marginalizing 
the traditional leadership in favor of several 
local power centers that were answerable 
to the security apparatus. Indeed, decades 
of neglect, corruption, and societal frag-
mentation under Assad family rule have 
provided fertile ground for militant groups 
there. Since its entry into Syria, the Islamic 
State has used a mixture of cash and terror 
to subdue and enlist local tribes in the east 
and create a reputation for ruthless effi-
ciency in providing order. This tactic has 
attracted recruits from other militant bri-
gades and made it difficult to build local 
alliances to counter the group. At the same 
time, the Islamic State itself is a product of 
fragmentation. The group, formerly known 
as the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant/ 
Greater Syria (ISIL or ISIS), was formed in 
April 2013 after a schism with the al-Nusra 
Front, al-Qaeda’s Syrian affiliate. 
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In a bid to stop the Islamic State and the 
less powerful al-Nusra, the United Arab 
Emirates convened a Western-backed 
meeting for Eastern tribal figures and mili-
tary defectors from the region in Abu Dhabi 
in November 2013. The apparent aim of the 
meeting was to explore the possibility of 
creating an equivalent to the Sahwa (awak-
ening) tribal alliances that had contained 
al-Qaeda’s gains in Iraq before the United 
States withdrew its troops from the country 
in December 2011. The meeting came to 
nothing, mainly because the participants 
lacked effective control over their tribes, 
and, unlike in Iraq, there were no U.S. 
troops in Syria on which to count. Some 
tribal representatives also objected to fight-
ing fellow Sunnis without being offered 
help to bring down the Assad regime.  
A Sunni backlash against the political 
order on both sides of the border then help-
ed the Islamic State to conquer territory 
quickly, leading to the declaration of a self-
styled caliphate in July 2014 that covered 
an arc of territory from the city of Mosul in 
Iraq through to eastern Syria to the out-
skirts of the province of Aleppo. The group, 
at least in theory, aspires for a global reach 
that harks back to the zenith of the Arab-
Muslim empire. 
Ripe for Militancy 
A difficult socioeconomic situation, in 
particular in Syria’s east, has provided the 
background for the Islamic State’s success 
there. The east had been hit by a drought 
that started in 2006 and lasted until the 
run-up to the revolt. Mismanagement of 
the water system and lack of investment, 
coupled with a dearth of rainfall, caused 
water and food shortages, destroyed agri-
culture and grazing land, and drove hun-
dreds of thousands of people from Raqqa, 
Deir al-Zor, and the mostly Kurdish prov-
ince of Hasakah in the adjoining northeast 
to seek a living in the peripheries of Damas-
cus, Deraa, Hama, and Aleppo – outskirts 
that developed into slums. 
The number of Syrians living under what 
the United Nations defines as “extreme 
poverty” – deprived of food, clean drinking 
water, sanitation, health, proper shelter, 
education, and information – increased 
between 2004 and 2010 from 2 million to 
as much as 3 million, out of a total popu-
lation of 21 million. Most of the extremely 
poor were inhabitants of a territory starting 
in Deir al-Zor and encompassing Hasakah, 
Raqqa, and its neighboring Aleppo country-
side. It is no coincidence that these regions, 
with the exception of the Kurdish areas, 
have formed a main support and recruit-
ment base for the Islamic State and al-Nusra. 
Until the revolt broke out, it appeared 
as if tribal loyalty and the emergency U.N. 
 
Facts on Eastern/Northeastern Syria 
Population: Approximately 3 million (till 
2010): 1.2 million in Deir al-Zor province; 
800,000 in Raqqa province; and 1 million 
in the mostly Kurdish province of Hasakah 
in the northeast. Significant numbers of 
Syria’s Kurds also live in the enclaves of 
Kobanê and Afrin in the province of Alep-
po, as well as in Kurdish neighborhoods 
of Damascus and Aleppo. 
Oil output: Syria’s total production was 
370,000 barrels per day in 2010, accord-
ing to official figures (actual production 
was estimated to have been significantly 
lower due to U.S. sanctions and deterio-
rating conditions of some fields). Hasakah 
accounts for approximately two-thirds of 
the output, with Deir al-Zor producing 
the remaining one-third. 
Oil fields: In Deir al-Zor, the largest are al-
Omar, al-Ward, and al-Tayyem, which are 
near the Iraqi border. In Hasakah, the 
largest fields are situated in the province’s 
northeastern corner along the border 
with Turkey and Iraq. 
Wheat production: Raqqa and Deir al-Zor 
together produce one-quarter of Syria’s 
overall output, which totaled 4 million 
tons in 2012. Hasakah accounts for one-
third of the country’s total output. 
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 food aid that was being distributed in the 
east to help mitigate the effects of the 
drought, as well as the pervasive security 
apparatus, would keep the region quiet. 
Farmers were grouped under a corrupt pro-
regime “Peasants Union,” which distributed 
subsidies for the wheat and cotton crops. 
Land and water rights were used to buy loy-
alty. Indeed, army and secret police person-
nel stemming from poor rural communi-
ties in the east, known as shawaya, were 
considered so reliable that they were in-
cluded in the storm troops that overran the 
city of Hama in February 1982, killing up to 
40,000 of their Sunni brethren and quelling 
the insurgency led by the Fighting Van-
guard branch of the Muslim Brotherhood.  
Drawing on the poor from the east has 
also worked for the Islamic State. The group 
has used a war chest, mainly financed by 
selling oil from captured wells, to recruit 
young men who have known little except 
poverty under the Assad regime, despite 
living in the vicinity of energy sources that 
were the regime’s main source of hard cur-
rency. Salaries of at least $400 per month 
have attracted thousands of Syrians, who 
now constitute a majority of the Islamic 
State’s rank-and-file in Syria, in contrast to 
foreign fighters, who formed the majority 
of fighters in the country when the Islamic 
State was created and, to date, dominate its 
command structure. 
Courting Salafists 
Another factor that has contributed to 
the rise of Islamist militants since the out-
break of the revolt is a legacy of the regime 
strengthening Salafist influence and allow-
ing militant Salafists to obtain military 
expertise. For example, in the 1980s and 
1990s, the authorities allowed Salafists 
returning from Saudi Arabia to preach in 
Deir al-Zor city to help counter the influ-
ence of the Muslim Brotherhood. They were 
mostly members of the Salafist-leaning 
Hizb al-Tahrir, a movement founded by a 
Palestinian cleric in the 1950s, which calls 
for the reestablishment of a pan-Islamic 
state ruled by Islamic law, or sharia. A crack-
down on Hizb al-Tahrir in Syria took place 
only in the late 1990s, when the group tried 
to lure two army lieutenants into joining 
its ranks. It resulted in the arrest of 920 of 
its members across the country in 1999 and 
the (temporary) demise of Eastern Salafism.  
But the U.S. invasion of Iraq a few years 
later prompted the Assad regime to open 
another chapter with Salafists, this time of 
the jihadist variety, who were less interest-
ed in ideological nuances and more reliant 
on the barrel of the gun to fulfill their reli-
gious vision. Hundreds of Syrian would-be-
jihadists were allowed to go fight in Iraq in 
2003, just before the toppling of Saddam 
Hussein, who had been an arch foe of the 
Assads. When Iraq’s Sunni insurgency gath-
ered steam a year later, clerics in Syria, 
licensed by the authorities, began recruit-
ing Syrian jihadists and sending them over 
the border. Facilitating a jihadist move-
ment appeared worthwhile to the Assad 
regime at the time to counter Western pres-
sure on it with regards to Lebanon – where 
it was accused of being behind the murder 
of statesman and former Prime Minister 
Rafiq al-Hariri – and to keep the United 
States occupied with Iraq. 
Assad’s honeymoon with the jihadists, 
however, began to sour in 2008 when a 
group of Iraqi-bound jihadists mounted an 
armed robbery on the offices of the Qad-
mous Bus Company in Deir al-Zor city to 
help finance their operations in Iraq. 
Qadmous is owned by the Khonda family, 
which is associated with the regime. At the 
same time, U.S. pressure was growing on 
Assad to curb the export of jihadists to Iraq. 
Assad sent one of his most ruthless lieuten-
ants – Brigadier General Jamil Hassan – to 
deal with the situation in the east. Assad 
had already transferred another top en-
forcer, Jamea Jamea, to head Military Intel-
ligence in Deir al-Zor, after a U.N. investiga-
tion mentioned Jamea in connection with 
the Hariri assassination. 
The two officials swiftly developed a ri-
valry but still managed to mount a crack-
down on Islamists. (Jamea was eventually 
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 killed in Deir al-Zor in October 2013). 
Among those rounded up, jailed, and tor-
tured in Deir al-Zor were hundreds of Sala-
fists who did not subscribe to jihad in Iraq 
and were more focused on religious prac-
tice, such as praying correctly or adhering 
to strict personal habits. As a consequence, 
the indiscriminate nature of the crackdown 
fomented Sunni anger toward the regime. 
At the same time, a policy of favoring Ala-
wites for government jobs, such as school 
teachers, intensified, further inflaming 
local Sunni sentiment. Before the revolt, 
across Syria, an estimated three-quarters 
of all managerial jobs in the public sector 
were held by Alawites. In the military, the 
sect dominated the officer corps by a simi-
lar proportion. 
The crackdown on Islamists was accom-
panied by an Iranian-backed drive to spread 
Shi’ism in rural areas of Syria, which result-
ed in the conversion of up to 21,000 Sunni 
villagers in Deir al-Zor between 2008 and 
2010. Their conversion was helped by pre-
ferential food aid and cash handouts. East-
ern Shi’ites, however, appear to have re-
verted back to Sunni Islam following a mas-
sacre committed by the al-Nusra Front of 
60 Shi’ites – mostly members of a pro-Assad 
militia – in the town of Hatla in the prov-
ince of Deir al-Zor in June 2013. 
The policy of using Salafists for its own 
purposes came back to haunt the regime. 
With the apparent aim to scuttle the initial-
ly peaceful uprising, Assad released hun-
dreds of Salafists between May and July of 
2011 from Sednaya Prison in the north of 
Damascus as part of a pardon that was 
extended also to criminals, many of whom 
were later recruited into loyalist militia. 
Among the Salafists who were released was 
Hassan Abboud, who went on to lead the 
Ahrar al-Sham brigade, one of the most 
formidable Islamist units, which suffered 
a severe blow when Abboud and its leader-
ship tier were killed in an explosion in 
northern Syria in September 2014. Also 
among Sednaya detainees were Ahmad 
(Abu Issa) al-Sheikh, who subsequently 
headed Suqur al-Sham – another militant 
group active in the north – and Zahran 
Aloush, who would later become leader of 
the Saudi-backed Jaish al-Islam (Army of 
Islam) and was the son of a Salafist sheikh 
living in exile in Saudi Arabia. At least four 
other inmates of Sednaya became com-
manders in the Islamic State.  
Thus, most of those Salafists set free in 
2011 quickly turned against the regime and 
became leading figures in the more vocifer-
ous militias of the uprising before also feud-
ing among themselves. In another conse-
quence, moderate rebel units, led primarily 
by officers who had defected from Assad’s 
army and grouped loosely under the Free 
Syrian Army (FSA) banner, quickly lost 
ground to better-financed Salafist jihadists, 
among whom the Islamic State and al-
Nusra emerged on top. 
Jihadist Rivalry 
The Islamic State and al-Nusra have fought 
several battles against each other across 
Syria but have kept mostly to their own fief-
doms since the U.S. air campaign began 
targeting both in September 2014. Al-Nusra 
has remained strong in the province of 
Hama and in the southern province of 
Deraa. In the east, the Islamic State was 
able to expel al-Nusra in July 2014 after 
overrunning al-Shuhail, an al-Nusra strong-
hold 40 km south of Deir al-Zor city. Lack-
ing the ruthless efficiency of the Islamic 
State, al-Nusra became embroiled in dis-
putes with local tribes in the east over terri-
tory and oil fields without being able to 
assert its authority. In contrast, the Islamic 
State has had fewer qualms about entering 
into feuds with local communities and has 
distinguished itself by firmly enforcing its 
own Sharia-inspired version of law and 
order. This approach has curbed theft and 
armed robbery – such as on the road from 
Raqqa to the town of Tel-Abiad on the Turk-
ish border – and won it a certain form of 
respect from inhabitants exhausted by pro-
longed lawlessness. 
Unlike al-Nusra, whose leaders have 
engaged in tactical discussions influenced 
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 by their al-Qaeda elders outside Syria about 
seeking as much popular support as possi-
ble to establish an emirate, the Islamic State 
just went ahead and declared a caliphate, 
in a “build it and they will come” approach 
without deep theological justifications. 
Also in contrast to al-Nusra, the Islamic 
State has found no problem in treating 
other Muslims as apostates deserving to be 
killed if they oppose its domination.  
The successes of the more radical “black 
and white” approach, backed by military 
prowess and financing from the oil in the 
east, drove hundreds of al-Nusra fighters to 
join the Islamic State in July/August 2014, 
after the Islamic State overran Shuhail. 
Recruitment also appears to have risen in 
the days immediately after the U.S. strikes.  
Islamic State Approach 
By late October 2014, stepped-up U.S. raids 
will have dented the Islamic State’s self- 
propagated image of omnipotence, lowered 
its revenue from oil, and will have increased 
calls among its leaders for reconciliation 
with al-Nusra. If such reconciliation occurs, 
it would vary by region. For example, the 
local al-Nusra commander in the Qalamoun 
Mountains along the border with Lebanon 
is more sympathetic to the Islamic State 
than other al-Nusra units based around 
Damascus, which were attacked by ISIL/ISIS, 
the predecessor of the Islamic State, in 
2012, after having captured several neigh-
borhoods from the Assad regime. The air 
campaign will also test the seriousness of 
tribal allegiances to the Islamic State, many 
of which were announced through videos 
choreographed by the media division of the 
group prior to the aerial bombardments. 
At the same time, the strikes are likely 
to curb the Islamic State’s mobility and 
ability to mount attacks, thus making it 
difficult to repeat the kinds of raids that 
have planted horror in the ranks of rebels 
and regime loyalists alike. In July 2014 the 
Islamic State had made a foray into Homs 
province, briefly capturing the al-Sha’ir 
desert gas field and killing up to 350 loyal-
ist militia, soldiers, and intelligence agents, 
as well as seizing military hardware. The 
group eventually withdrew, thus keeping 
the lines of confrontation with the regime 
away from the main highway running 
from the north to the south of the country, 
which is crucial for the regime’s supplies. 
Before, several leading Islamist rebels 
and activists from Homs had called on the 
Islamic State to advance into the province 
and help avenge the destruction of Homs 
city, whose Sunni neighborhoods had been 
flattened in carpet bombings by the regime. 
The Islamic State, however, has mostly 
focused its military operations – since the 
schism with al-Nusra – on “liberating the 
liberated,” meaning seizure of territory 
already captured from the Assad regime by 
the FSA, al-Nusra, or by other rebel units.  
Major confrontations with Assad’s forces 
mostly broke out in the east, and only after 
the regime’s air force bombed Islamic State 
positions following the group’s capture of 
the city of Mosul in Iraq in June 2014. It was 
this capture and the proclamation of the 
caliphate that prompted the U.S.-backed 
counteroffensive by the pro-Iranian Shi’ite 
government in Baghdad – a supporter of 
Assad – and by Kurdish Peshmerga and 
units of the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK).  
Paradoxically, while the United States 
and its European allies backed up PKK fight-
ers in Iraq from the air, the PKK is consid-
ered a terrorist organization by both the 
United States and the EU. The PKK is also 
fighting the Islamic State in Syria along 
with its de facto subsidiary, the Kurdish 
Democratic Union Party (PYD). Keen to 
mend ties with Turkey, the Assad regime 
had cracked down on the PKK before the 
revolt broke out in March 2011, but the 
regime and the PYD have since reestablish-
ed lines of communications and military 
understandings; the regime has withdrawn 
most of its forces from the northeast and 
allowed the PYD to establish self-rule in the 
Kurdish enclaves. 
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 Stopping Islamic State’s Advance? 
The airstrikes against the Islamic State in 
Iraq, which began around the Sinjar Moun-
tains in August 2014, were a precursor of 
the Syria campaign. But the lack of U.S. 
ground forces, even in a non-combat role 
such as in Iraq, and a dearth of strong local 
allies make success in Syria unlikely. The 
U.S. aerial bombings have made the frontier 
more difficult to cross and will thus pre-
vent fighters easily moving from one the-
ater to the other. Indeed, foreign fighters 
had begun crossing from Iraq into Syria in 
a “facilitator” capacity in 2012 to provide 
bomb-making and suicide-bombing exper-
tise. In turn, jihadists operating in Syria 
crossed into Iraq simply to take a break 
from fighting. Later, jihadists from Iraq 
settled in Syria and inter-married.  
In Iraq, U.S. air cover has allowed Kurd-
ish Peshmerga units and Shi’ite militias 
backed by Iran to roll back some of the 
Islamic State’s advances in northern Iraq 
that came close to Erbil, capital of Iraqi Kur-
distan, in August 2014, and to subsequently 
go on the offensive. But across the border, 
in Hasakah province, the PKK/PYD has not 
managed to fend off the Islamic State’s ad-
vances since the U.S.-led strikes expanded 
into Syria, indicating that Kurdish forces in 
Syria might lack the military capability to 
lead the fight against the Islamic State.  
Furthermore, the Islamic State has been 
able to capitalize on Arab tribal resentment 
of what is seen as overreaching Kurdish 
nationalism and territorial claims. Hasakah 
province, which has a large Arab population, 
remains broadly divided into territory con-
trolled by the PYD, the Islamic State, and its 
allies, and Arab tribes allied with the regime. 
In late September 2014, when U.S. airstrikes 
were launched against Islamic State fighters 
in this part of Syria, the strikes were seen 
by many Arabs as a form of blatant support 
for PYD dominance rather than a hit against 
terrorism. This has placed the mainstream 
National Coalition of Syrian Revolution and 
Opposition Forces, which has had delicate 
relations with the Kurds and has boycotted 
the PYD, in a difficult position.  
Further west, the U.S. airstrikes have also 
been targeting Islamic State forces that have 
attacked the Kurdish enclave of Kobanê (of-
ficial name: Ain al-Arab) on the border with 
Turkey, slowing the group’s advance into 
the town. But the strikes have received only 
lukewarm support from Turkey, which has 
differences with Washington on how to 
deal with the Syrian conflict and is wary of 
rising PKK strength. Reluctant to put troops 
on the ground, Ankara maintains that the 
best option to protect civilians would be 
the establishment of safe zones, in which 
the local population in northern Syria as 
well as refugees could be protected. At the 
same time, Turkey made it clear that it 
would not go it alone to establish such a 
safe zone but only with its Western allies.  
Control of Oil 
By the end of September 2014, the U.S.-led 
air campaign appeared to have diminished 
oil and gas production capacities in Deir al-
Zor, robbing the Islamic State of a main 
source of revenue and making it easier for 
the regime, or the opposition, to regain 
support in the region through the use of 
cash. Before supply disappeared from the 
market, shortages had almost doubled the 
price of gasoil sourced from Islamic State 
territory in the east in September 2014 to 
$110 for 200 liters. Cooking gas bottled in 
the east had also doubled in price during 
the same period, as aerial bombardment 
made continued production difficult. 
Indeed, the Islamic State’s sweep of the 
east had concentrated control for most of 
the region’s oil fields – except those with 
Kurdish militia – in the hands of the group, 
ending a chaotic struggle between different 
rebel groups, armed gangs, and various 
tribes. Thus, prior to the U.S. airstrikes, al-
though industrial-scale production had 
mostly ended with the defeat of the regime 
in most of the east, the region witnessed 
a relative oil boom based on free-flowing 
wells supplying crude and gas oil extracted 
with basic refining techniques. It provided 
the Islamic State with an estimated $80–
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 $100 million a month in revenue. Down-
stream, the Islamic State has also been pres-
ent along the pipeline network connecting 
the oil fields of Hasakah, which are largely 
under Kurdish control, to the country’s two 
oil refineries in the regime-held cities of 
Homs and Banias. No major attacks on the 
pipelines have been reported since the Is-
lamic State took hold of the east, indicating 
that oil might still be flowing through them. 
This provides another twist to the apparent 
tacit arrangements between the Islamic State 
and the regime, arrangements that seems 
to also cover electricity from the Tabqa 
hydroelectric dam in the province of Raqqa, 
which is controlled by the Islamic State. 
The importance of oil as a source of reve-
nue for the Islamic State was highlighted 
by killings carried out by the group against 
the Shueitat tribe, which attempted to re-
sist the Islamic State’s takeover of oil wells 
in territory associated with the tribe, near 
the Iraqi border, which boasts some of the 
biggest oil wells in the province of Deir al-
Zor. In reaction, hundreds of Shueitat mem-
bers were executed by the Islamic State 
between July and September 2014. Appeals 
by the Shueitat for help from neighboring 
tribes went unanswered and the most the 
National Coalition could do was issue state-
ments condemning the massacre. 
Conclusions and Recommendations 
The U.S.-led airstrikes have driven the Is-
lamic State to move fighters and hardware 
into residential areas of Deir al-Zor and 
Raqqa, taking the shine off the group’s bold 
image but apparently not denting the ap-
peal of militant Islam among rural Sunnis, 
who have been at the forefront of the Syr-
ian revolt and increasingly subscribe to a 
sectarian understanding of the conflict. 
These communities do not support the kill-
ing of fellow fighters who have dealt mili-
tary blows to a minority Alawite regime, 
which they see as using massive force indis-
criminately to hang on to power and pre-
vent the political ascendency of the majori-
ty Sunni population. Sympathy with al-
Nusra in particular appears to have risen, 
whereas the Islamic State is seen as more of 
an alien force that might have to be neutra-
lized – but only after the Assad regime falls. 
In the east, where Western-backed oppo-
sition brigades have virtually disappeared 
and regime loyalist forces are still entrench-
ed in the southern sector of Deir al-Zor, the 
regime has been trying to crawl back as a 
result of the continuing air bombings. In-
deed, emboldened by the U.S. strikes, re-
gime representatives have been contacting 
tribal figures who have sided with the Is-
lamic State, offering them money and 
weapons if they switch sides. Assad’s forces 
also attempted to take advantage of the U.S. 
strikes by making a foray into parts of Deir 
al-Zor in mid-October 2014, which was re-
pelled by the Islamic State and other Islam-
ists. In retaliation, a residential quarter in 
Deir al-Zor was shelled, leaving seven civil-
ians dead and dozens wounded. Thus, even 
if the air attacks against the Islamic State 
curb the group’s advances, they will not 
halt a slide to more Sunni radicalization 
related to the underlying causes of the 
Syrian conflict and the crackdown on the 
revolt by Assad’s security forces. 
Still, the U.S. air attacks present a rare 
opportunity to advance progress toward an 
overall solution to the conflict and change 
Western taboos of avoiding military inter-
vention at almost any cost. This non-inter-
vention mantra has emboldened Assad and 
allowed his forces to turn Syria into killing 
fields, and helped to further Islamist radi-
calism, which will only deepen if the aerial 
bombings against the Islamic State and al-
Nusra are seen as propping up Assad or as 
waging a battle on his behalf (and in tacit 
alliance with him). Expectations that the 
U.S. bombing campaign will benefit the 
Assad regime has helped strengthen the 
Syrian pound following it decline in value 
in the weeks before the campaign on fears 
that the regime would also be targeted. 
At the same time, the regime is unlikely 
to risk thrusting its Alawite fighting core 
into a far-reaching campaign against out-
lying Sunni regions to stamp out the jihad-
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 ists and potentially incur large losses. Assad 
therefore has little to offer the U.S.-led alli-
ance. In the absence of an immediate politi-
cal settlement, strengthening moderate reb-
els appears to be the only available option, 
since cooperation with Assad would feed 
the Sunni backlash that is helping foster 
jihadism. The U.S. military, which has start-
ed training moderate rebels, says a rebel 
force of 12,000 to 15,000 would be needed 
to defeat the Islamic State in the east with 
American air support. And indeed, if the 
airstrikes sharply weaken the Islamic State 
in eastern Syria, there is a strong risk of a 
vacuum developing that would be filled by 
regime forces rather than by an alliance 
of Free Syrian Army and Islamist brigades. 
Still, even if such a force were assembled, 
outside personnel would be needed to pro-
vide logistics, engineering knowhow, main-
tenance, and tactical support. That would 
significantly change the offhand approach 
that the Friends of Syria – the international 
pro-opposition alliance – have adopted to-
ward Syria. 
Indeed, distrust of international support 
has driven many defectors from Assad’s 
military to sit on the sidelines, as previous 
efforts to strengthen the opposition mili-
tarily were marred by disagreements among 
the Friends of Syria and ended in debacles. 
But the defectors have maintained much 
of their networks. They could help identify 
competent personnel to set up a more for-
midable force that could fill the void in the 
country’s east and increase pressure on the 
Assad regime to compromise with regard 
to local ceasefires and once international 
peace talks are revived. 
One crucial element of a changed ap-
proach by the Friends of Syria should be to 
support the establishment of safe zones, 
which would not only protect Kurdish civil-
ians from Islamic State aggression but also 
extend to the Sunni population under con-
tinuous attack from the Assad regime. The 
establishment of such zones would show 
Syrians that the West cares about the well-
being of Syrians rather than just fearing 
that foreign fighters will return to their 
countries of origin. In addition, the inclu-
sion of regions inhabited by Alawites and 
other minorities into long-mooted safe 
zones would provide an alternative to these 
parts of the population rather than them 
betting on protection by the regime. Safe 
zones would also allow the opposition gov-
ernment, operating in exile from southern 
Turkey, to set up a foothold inside Syria. 
The establishment of such safe zones 
faces a major challenge. In order to offer 
effective protection against regime bomb-
ings, including from artillery, a no-fly zone 
would not be sufficient. Yet, so far, no coun-
try has been willing to provide the neces-
sary intervention on the ground. In October 
2014, the Turkish government obtained 
authorization from parliament for possible 
military intervention in Syria and Iraq and 
to allow foreign troops to be stationed in its 
territory for the same purpose. But in light 
of continuing differences with the West 
over priorities in the fight in Syria, Turkey 
will likely avoid military engagement and 
focus on defending its own territory. A raid 
by Turkish warplanes on PKK bases in Iraq 
in mid-October appeared to be in line with 
this approach, as was Ankara’s lukewarm 
support for U.S. airstrikes on the Islamic 
State. At least one of Turkey’s concerns – 
that a safe zone would strengthen Kurdish 
autonomy in northern Syria – could be al-
layed by joint positions adopted by the PYD 
and the National Coalition on the future 
unity of the country as well as a joining of 
forces in the fight against the Islamic State. 
It is clear that genuine stabilization can 
only be achieved through a political settle-
ment that allows for a democratic-based 
alternative to the Assad regime and the 
jihadists, allaying minority concerns about 
a post-Assad Syria and Sunni fears that mi-
norities across the Middle East are coalesc-
ing against them with tacit Western sup-
port. Regional heavyweights Turkey, Iran, 
and Saudi Arabia, as well as Russia and the 
West, need to endorse such a settlement as 
a way to contain the militant sectarianism 
that is spreading across the Middle East. 
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